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American Profiles on Capitol Hill: A Confidential Study for the British Foreign Office in 1943

Edited by Thomas E. Hachey

THE course of the war in Europe shifted in the autumn of 1942. For more than three years events had moved in Hitler's favor, but by the end of 1942 the trend of successive German victories was reversed: the Russians held firm at Stalingrad, the British broke out of Egypt, and the Americans landed in French North Africa. In January, 1943, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met at the Moroccan port of Casablanca where they reached the decision to invade and occupy Italy. Behind the facade of Allied unanimity, however, there were numerous issues complicating Anglo-American relations. Washington and London each viewed global policies in terms of their respective national interests.

Even before the tide began to turn against the Axis Powers in World War II, the British government had developed a keen interest in the manner in which the United States Congress shaped or influenced American foreign policy. Considerable attention was given to reports which reached the Foreign Office from the British Embassy in Washington during 1940 and 1941 respecting the isolationist sentiments of American lawmakers and the probable impact of United States neutrality legis-

lation upon England's war effort. Foreign Office memoranda and communications for 1942 reflect London's dismay with those congressional spokesmen who either misunderstood or found suspect Britain's motives for seeking to defend her global Empire. Indeed, a steady flow of letters, telegrams, and dispatches between His Majesty's Embassy at Washington and the British Foreign Office, from late 1939 to early 1943, reveals the English government's increasing anxiety over the evident relationship between partisan politics and the course of American foreign policy.¹

On April 19, 1943, Viscount Halifax, Britain's Ambassador at Washington, sent Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden his *confidential* dispatch no. 292 which contained a secret memorandum on the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. The memorandum was the first British examination of the specific nature and propensities of the two Congressional committees on foreign affairs, and it also provides some acute commentary on the respective members of each committee.²

NOTE: The author is indebted to the Marquette University Committee on Research for the generous grant which permitted him to spend a summer in London working with materials for both this article and a more extensive study of twentieth-century British foreign policy.

¹ For representative documents which clearly portray this official British mood, see F.O. 371/24248, 24249 for 1940; F.O. 371/26246, 26149, 26180 for 1941; and F.O. 371/30655, 30652, 30685 for 1942.

² Documents such as these would have remained closed to the public had it not been for a Parliamentary ruling in 1971 which permitted the opening of

It is not coincidental that this memorandum is more literate, incisive, and sharply opinionated than much of the routine diplomatic verbiage which often typified British Embassy reports. The author of the document is Professor Isaiah Berlin who, before the War, had been a Fellow at All Souls and at New College, Oxford. Berlin began his war service in the Ministry of Information, working first with the British Information Service in New York and, in 1942, he was transferred to the Embassy in Washington for the duration of the Second World War. His wide range of American acquaintances, both personal and official, and his considerable knowledge of the country in which he was posted doubtlessly proved useful in the preparation of many remarkably perceptive analyses regarding probable U.S. moods or motives on a wide number of issues. Berlin's reports were almost always received with enthusiasm by members of the American department at the Foreign Office and, as that ministry's minutes also reveal, were often thought sufficiently significant to warrant the attention of the British War Cabinet.³

London received the Halifax dispatch con-

taining Berlin's memorandum on April 28, 1943. In response, one Foreign Office official wrote the following minute:

This is a useful and timely piece on the Foreign Relations Committee, which, as Mr. Berlin points out, now wields greater influence than at any period during the ten years of Mr. Roosevelt's administration.

... Personally, I welcome the new determination in the Senate to assert itself and to show signs of taking the responsibility which, in the last resort, belongs to it. Better this than it should remain Sphinx-like, only to come forward at the eleventh hour, once again to dash the hopes of the waiting world [a reference to the Senate's rejection of Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations]. Mr. Berlin concludes by suggesting that we may be witnessing the beginnings of a new, if somewhat uneasy measure of co-operation between the two branches of the United States Government. We may hope that this is so, for only if the Senate and the Presidency can be brought more or less into step with one another can there be any real prospect of U.S. participation in a system to keep the peace.⁴

There is no reference among Foreign Office minutes to the part of Berlin's memorandum which pertains to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. The probable explanation is that Lord Halifax's dispatch of April 19, 1943, may have contained only that part of the report which comments upon the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, while the section dealing with the House Committee may have been sent subsequently under separate cover. This would account for the absence of any reference to the latter part of the memorandum in the Foreign Office minutes, and also for Berlin's use of the word "Annex" in the title which prefaces the part of his report devoted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In any event, London did possess the entire memorandum by May 22, 1943, the date on which several copies were published in the Foreign Office Confidential Print series for secret distribution among the

government archives through the year 1945. The document presented here was made available to the public for the first time in the summer of 1972. Other than this 1971 exception for World War II records and a few papers which are closed for fifty years, access to British Government Archives is currently governed by the Public Records Act of 1967, which with the first day of each year advances the open date for records which are thirty years old.

³ Sir Isaiah Berlin is the author of numerous books which include *Karl Marx* (1939), *Historical Inevitability* (1954), *The Age of Enlightenment* (1956), *Moses Hess* (1958), and *Two Concepts of Liberty* (1959). After serving His Majesty's Government at the British Embassy in Moscow from September, 1945, to January, 1946, he lectured as visiting professor at a number of American universities including Harvard, the University of Chicago, Princeton, and City College of New York. Sir Isaiah also translated Turgenev's *First Love* (1950), wrote a fictional work entitled *The Hedgehog and the Fox* (1953), was Mellon Lecturer at the National Gallery of Art in Washington (1965), served as a member of the Board of Directors of the Royal Opera House at London's Covent Garden (1954-1965), and held the position of Governor of the University of Jerusalem from 1954 to 1965. President of Wolfson College, Oxford, since 1966, he received an honorary D.Litt. degree from Brandeis University in 1967.

⁴ Foreign Office Minute, (signature illegible), May 8, 1943. F.O. 371/34181.

members of Prime Minister Churchill's War Cabinet.⁵

The value of Professor Berlin's memorandum lies in its revelation to Americans of the impressions which congressional procedures and personalities had upon a professionally trained and highly skilled foreign observer. Ever sensitive to people or policies that reflected Anglophile or Anglophobe persuasions, the memorandum also reflects the caution of other contemporary British officials in America who warned London not to mistake superficial expressions of good will by American legislators as evidence of any meaningful United States commitment to participation in a post-war international system. Individual portraits are equally engaging, as newly coined labels such as "nationalist" and "internationalist" are used to describe persons or positions which, during America's period of neutrality, had been referred to as "isolationist" and "interventionist." Whatever the merit of the author's opinions or conclusions, the document's special significance derives from the serious attention which it was accorded by a British Government anxious about the future foreign policy of its closest war-time ally. The memorandum reads as follows:⁶


The Senate Foreign Relations Committee

(Most Confidential).

The Senate of the United States, as is well known, keeps a close watch on foreign policy, not merely in theory but in practice. The two-thirds majority of the Senate needed for the ratification of all foreign treaties is only the best known of its powers, but its general control over all legislation and its power of veto over the appointment of ambassadors and other high public officials, and the influence of its views over public opinion, give it a unique position in the determination of United States foreign policy. The organ within the Senate which moulds this policy is the

⁵ Foreign Office Minute, (unsigned), May 22, 1943. F.O. 371/34181. This minute, registry number A3938/361/45, clearly confirms that the complete memorandum was printed in its final form on May 22.

⁶ Dispatch No. 292, British Embassy, Washington, to the London Foreign Office, April 19, 1943. F.O. 371/34181. The vagaries of spelling, punctuation, and capitalization have been followed exactly as in the original manuscript.



Current Biography, 1964

Sir Isaiah Berlin in his study.

Foreign Relations Committee, which has it in its power to alter, delay and, under certain political circumstances, to veto almost any piece of major policy in this field. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House is a far weaker body by comparison; it has no power of interference with treaties, and, while it has the same power over Bills dealing with foreign affairs as over other legislation, its influence in this field is normally limited, and becomes formidable only when the Senate is an uncertain ally of or hostile to the Administration for the reasons set out below.

The foreign policy of the United States is implemented partly through Executive Orders of the President (with or without seeking the approval of Congress, as the President thinks expedient) and, in lesser matters, the decisions of the relevant Executive Departments; partly by Acts of Congress. When the Senate is favourably disposed to the Executive, the President has considerable freedom of choice over

the means whereby he exercises his powers, since his Executive Orders are unlikely to be challenged by the Senate as overstepping its prerogatives, or, even if they are so challenged by the minority party, can be submitted to the Senate with a reasonable expectation of being passed by that body. When this is the case (as it has been roughly from 1932 to 1938 and from 1940 to 1942) the House Committee can do little to interfere. However anxious it may be to alter the course of foreign policy, it can only do so by initiating Bills and resolutions of its own, or delaying or defeating Bills which come down to it from the Senate, or achieving the same effect by amendments (since it has no power either over appointments or over treaties). But, if the Senate and the President are in alliance, no House foreign policy Bill disapproved by the Administration would ever pass the Senate, and, conversely, whenever it is likely that a measure desired by the Administration might be defeated or delayed by the House, the President will tend to embody it in an Executive Order, secure in the knowledge that the Senate will not challenge this and that he can probably afford to ignore the attitude of the House. The only permanent weapon which the House possesses against the encroachment of the growing powers of the Executive is in the control of appropriations, which it shares with the Senate. A wise President is unlikely to push through a measure of foreign policy by Executive Order if it seems probable that either Chamber will refuse to vote the relevant appropriation. Mr. Hoover paid dearly for ignoring this. When the Senate is critical of the Administration's policies the House does become a strong additional check on the Administration, since the President's use of Executive Orders as an alternative to legislation by Congress becomes precarious if too frequent exercise of this function is disapproved of by a jealous Senate. In this situation policies distasteful to the Administration may be initiated either in the House or in the Senate. This is threatening to be increasingly the case at present, since the elections of November 1942 have given the combination of Republicans and Southern Democrats, who are none too friendly to the President, an inconveniently large majority, with the result that the two foreign policy

committees of Congress today possess, and are aware of possessing, far greater influence than at any period during the first ten years of the Roosevelt administration.

As legislation affecting foreign policy, before being considered by Congress, is required to be voted upon by the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, the composition of these bodies and their general temper becomes of immediate moment to any Power whose fortunes are vitally affected by the foreign policy of the United States.

The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.

This committee consists of twenty-three members, fifteen Democrats, seven Republicans and one Independent. The Democrats are: Connally of Texas, chairman; Barkley of Kentucky; George of Georgia; Glass of Virginia; Thomas of Utah; Wagner of New York; Van Nuys of Indiana; Green of Rhode Island; Reynolds of North Carolina; Guffey of Pennsylvania; Gillette of Iowa; Tunnell of Delaware; Clark of Missouri; Pepper of Florida; Murray of Montana. The Republicans are: Johnson of California; Nye of North Dakota; Capper of Kansas; Vandenberg of Michigan; White of Maine; Shipstead of Minnesota; Davis of Pennsylvania. The Progressive is La Follette of Wisconsin [Independent].

Of these, eight Democrats are all-out supporters of the Administration with an undeviating voting record on foreign policy in general, on all war measures, and more particularly on reciprocal trade (which, however, is not the business of the Foreign Relations Committee), in which the local interests of the States normally determine the votes of their Congressional delegations. They are: Barkley, Pepper, Tunnell, Murray, Wagner, Green, Thomas and Guffey. In addition to these, three Democrats and one Republican normally vote with the Administration but are not wholly reliable, particularly when the interests of their own States come into play. These are: Connally, George, Glass, White (Republican). Five Republicans and two Democrats are opposed to the Administration's foreign policies with no hope of redemption. They are: Nye, Johnson, Capper, Shipstead


(Republicans), and Clark and Reynolds (Democrats). The remaining five are doubtful quantities, on the whole opposed to the Administration but liable to vote with it on occasion. They are: Vandenberg and Davis (Republicans), Gillette and Van Nuys (Democrats), and La Follette (Progressive).

The number on which the Administration can normally count for support of its policies is, therefore, twelve (eight steady and four dubious allies) against eleven (six certain and five less certain opponents). Thus the majority upon which the Administration is forced from time to time to place its hopes consists precisely of one. The uncertainty which this must communicate to the plans and hopes of the Administration will, therefore, be obvious. A more detailed analysis of the individual Senators, their voting records, and general tendencies is attached.

1. The chairman of the Committee, Tom Connally of Texas, is a very typical, exuberant Southern figure with the appearance and mannerisms of an old-fashioned actor and a gay and hearty manner which conceals lack both of strength and of clear public principles. He is normally the spokesman of the Administration and, in particular, of the Department of State. His voting record is that of a straight interventionist. His principal point of deviation from Mr. [Cordell] Hull's policies is the subject to which Mr. Hull has dedicated a large portion of his life, namely, the policy of reciprocal trade. Representing as he does, a great cattle breeding State, his enthusiasm for free trade with, e.g., the Argentine, is not ardent. He has been a solid supporter of the department's policies toward, e.g., France and North Africa. His support of its economic policies is regarded as doubtful. On internal issues he shares all the beliefs and prejudices of the South.

2. **Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky—a Democratic party "wheelhorse" who will pull the Administration wagon through thick and thin.** Although he is the Majority Leader in the Senate, he is not an adroit negotiator, but a loyal supporter of the President come hell or high water.

3. **Walter F. George of Georgia—an honorable but narrow Southern Conservative, who incurred the displeasure of the New Deal in 1938 when an unsuccessful attempt to "purge"**



Society's Iconographic Collections

Senator Tom Connally of Texas in January, 1953, preparing to leave his office after thirty-six years in Congress.

him was made by its then leaders (in particular, [Edward] Flynn, [Harry] Hopkins, and [Thomas] Corcoran). This attempt increased his popularity in his State and in the Senate. He left the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee in order to head the equally important Finance Committee, and is an exceedingly influential figure in the Senate, and the hope of the Conservatives in many parts of the United States. Although he acutely dislikes the domestic policies of the Administration, he has never wavered in support of its foreign policy and, like the other cotton and tobacco Senators, supports Mr. Hull's reciprocal trade agreements.

4. Carter Glass of Virginia, is very old and frail and something of a legend in the South. The fruit-growing interests of his State make him an opponent of the reciprocal trade pacts, but on all other questions he has loyally supported the President's anti-Isolationist policy. He cannot have many years of active service before him.⁷

5. Claude Pepper of Florida, is a loud-voiced and fiery New Deal politician. Before Pearl Harbour, he was a most ardent interventionist. He is equally Russophile and apt to be critical of British Imperial policy. He is an out and out internationalist and champion of labour and negro rights (Florida has

⁷ Senator Glass died in Washington, May 28, 1946.

no poll tax) and thus a passionate supporter of the Administration's more internationalist policies. He is occasionally used by the President for the purpose of sending up trial balloons in matters of foreign policy. With all these qualities, he is, in his methods, a thoroughly opportunist politician.

6. Robert Reynolds of North Carolina, is exceptional among Southerners, in that he is a bitter Isolationist of a disreputable kind. His Anglophobia is proverbial and his journal *The Vindicator* is a low-grade Fascist sheet. He is distrusted by the majority of his colleagues and his assumption of the chairmanship of the Military Affairs Committee (by seniority) was universally regarded as disastrous outside his own circle of chauvinist demagogues. His State produces cotton and tobacco and he, therefore, votes for reciprocal trade pacts.⁸

7. Frederick Van Nuys of Indiana—his voting record is a very mixed one; in 1939 he was one of the members of the committee which voted to postpone consideration of the Neutrality Act in June of that year; in October he voted for a revision but not for repeal. Like George and Gillette, he is one of the Senators whom the 1938 purge failed to eliminate, and his feeling towards the President is, therefore, somewhat cool. He voted for Lend-Lease in common with most Democrats, against reciprocal trade agreements, and occasionally votes with the Farm *Bloc*. A man of very uncertain views tinged with isolationism and liable, on the whole, to vote with the Conservatives.

8. Guy M. Gillette of Iowa, resembles Van Nuys in that he is a typical Mid-Western Senator with a moderately steady Isolationist voting record, although he is not an articulate opponent of the Administration's policy. Unlike Van Nuys, he is a supporter of reciprocal trade pacts but shares his suspicion of the President. A simple, confused, but very honest Presbyterian of considerable character, he

⁸ Professor Berlin's inference concerning fascism is both intemperate and gratuitous. Senator Reynolds, the only Southern isolationist before Pearl Harbor, angered the British. Even after America's entry into the war Reynolds remained one of the few Southern Democrats to oppose President Roosevelt's collaborative efforts with the Allies in foreign policy matters. For a comprehensive study see Julian McIver Pleasant, "The Senatorial Career of Robert Rice Reynolds" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1971).

views the corn interest, which he represents, with an almost religious devotion. He leads the Senate Lobby interested in producing synthetic rubber out of corn, and coming from the Republican corn belt, is virtually a Republican in sentiment and conduct. He is not at all anti-British, but as isolationist as his general environment. His speeches in Congress take the form of thinking aloud. On foreign policy he is not a bigoted anti-Rooseveltite but is exceedingly uncertain.

9. Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah—a Mormon ex-missionary, whose work was mostly done in the Far East. He speaks Japanese fluently, and his attitudes towards post-war problems is coloured principally by his Far Eastern views which are summed up in his statement that "the days of the white man's domination are over and the British Empire is almost certain to be dissolved in that part of the world." He is an out and out internationalist and interventionist, who has voted with the Administration on all foreign measures. He is essentially a free trader but, nevertheless, occasionally votes with the Farm *Bloc* which is powerful in the agricultural State which he represents. He is an ardent champion of the Jewish army scheme.

10. Theodore Francis Green, of Rhode Island—a former Governor of his State, he is, for all his years, a typical "progressive" pro-New Deal businessman. While he is a man of limited intellect, he is right-minded to a degree and a completely reliable ally of the Administration. He is a free trader with a particular hatred of the "Silver *Bloc*" in the Senate.

11. Joseph F. Guffey, of Pennsylvania—a noisy Administration supporter who wraps himself in the Roosevelt flag and has been advocating for a fourth term for some time. A very typical Pennsylvania politician who has decided to throw his lot in with the President and has thus become an obedient party hack not of the purest integrity. Consistently votes in the opposite direction to his fellow Senator from Pennsylvania, James Davis (q.v.).

12. Senator James Tunnell, of Delaware—A Wilsonian with an unblemished pro-Administration voting record.

13. Senator James E. Murray, of Montana—a millionaire lawyer who tries to out-do [Burton K.] Wheeler as a champion of small busi-

ness and labour against big business monopoly (e.g., the Anaconda Company which dominates his copper-producing State). An advocate of the second front and of stronger ties with Britain. A free trader except on copper issues. A Roman Catholic.

14. Bennett Champ Clark, of Missouri—a rabid isolationist and member of the American First Committee who has steadily voted against all the foreign policies and war measures of the Administration with the exception of the reciprocal trade agreements (in which the corn exporters of Missouri have some interest). A member of the Wheeler-Nye-[Robert A.] Taft coterie. An avowed Anglophobe.

15. Robert Wagner of New York—a veteran Liberal Tammany statesman, author of the United States labour code and devotee of the New Deal who is respected by the White House for his political acumen within his own State no less than for his political connexions. Greatest champion of the Liberal cause in the United States Senate since [George W.] Norris. A typical anti-Nazi German Democrat who has supported all the Administration measures, being usually well in advance of them.

Republicans

16. Hiram W. Johnson, of California, is the Isolationists' elder statesman and the only surviving member of the [William E.] Borah-[Henry Cabot, Jr.] Lodge-Johnson combination which led the fight against the League in 1919 and 1920. He is an implacable and uncompromising Isolationist with immense prestige in California, of which he has twice been Governor. His election to the Senate has not been opposed for many years by either party. He is acutely Pacific-conscious and is a champion of a more adequate defence of the West Coast. He is a member of the Farm *Bloc* and is *au fond*, against foreign affairs as such; his view of Europe as a sink of iniquity has not changed in any particular since 1912, when he founded a short-lived progressive party. His prestige in Congress is still great and his parliamentary skill should not be underestimated.

17. Gerald Nye of North Dakota—is a notorious fire-eating Anglophobe Isolationist. His principal claim to fame rests on his com-

mittee which investigated the American armament industry a few years before the war, and much popular anti-British feeling stems from publicity which was accorded to that committee. He is a member of the Farm *Bloc*, and possesses some influence in the Republican senatorial caucus. He has Fascist connexions, and works closely with Wheeler and Reynolds inside and outside the Senate. His *bête noire* is [Wendell] Willkie, whom he hates even more than the British Empire; indeed, he recently went to the length of defending the latter against the criticisms of the former, since he evidently regards any stick as good enough to beat Willkie with.⁹

18. Arthur Capper of Kansas—a solid, stolid, 78-year-old reactionary from the corn belt, who is the very voice of Mid-Western "grass root" isolationism. A newspaper proprietor who was once described as contriving to sit on the fence and keep both ears on the ground at the same time. Like Johnson and Nye, an unwavering opponent of all the Administration's foreign policies, including reciprocal trade.

19. Arthur Vandenberg—a member of an old Dutch family and a respectable Mid Western Isolationist. A very adroit political manipulator, and expert parliamentarian and skillful debater. He has perennial presidential ambitions, and is grooming himself into a position of elder statesman. He is something of a snob, not at all Anglophobe, and is a fairly frequent visitor at the White House and the State Department. In common with the rest of his State delegation he votes against the Administration's foreign policies, but has nothing virulent in his constitution and is anxious to convey the impression of reasonableness and moderation. He denies that he is or ever was an Isolationist, and describes himself as a Nationalist ("like Mr. Churchill").

⁹The charge that Gerald Nye was a "fire-eating Anglophobe Isolationist" is not without merit, nor does Professor Berlin's irritation over that assumption seem peculiar. But what is wholly unwarranted is Berlin's accusation that Nye had fascist connections. Nye's isolationism derived from an instinctive agrarian neutrality rather than from any ideological persuasion or anti-British bias. See Wayne S. Cole, *Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations* (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962).

20. Wallace H. White, Jr., of Maine—a very timid figure with a mixed voting record. After voting against the earlier foreign policies of the Administration, he voted for lend-lease and all other Administration measures thereafter. A mild opponent of reciprocal trade pacts.

21. Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota—a rabid Isolationist of Norwegian descent, elected largely by the Scandinavian vote. A very narrow, bigoted, crotchety man, intensely antagonistic to Minnesota's Governor [Harold] Stassen. A member of the Farm *Bloc* and consistently votes against the Administration.

22. James Davis of Pennsylvania—defeated for the governorship of his State in 1942. Commonly known as “puddler Jim” since he started his career as a steel worker. He was born in South Wales, became a Labour politician during the last war and Secretary of Labour shortly afterward. He is violently hated by organised labour, since he is regarded as having prostituted his labour connexion only in order to betray his fellow-workers over and over again. He is a pure opportunist, put into the Senate by the powerful Sun Oil interest in Pennsylvania, declares that he is not an Isolationist. This is true only in so far as he appears to have no convictions of any kind, and will vote in whatever direction is required by the interest which is running him at any given moment. His *bête noire* is his fellow Pennsylvanian in the Senate, Guffey (q.v.).

23. Robert La Follette of Wisconsin—son of the celebrated Governor and brother of ex-Governor Philip La Follette of that State. Intimately tied with the very peculiar “progressive” Wisconsin political organisation, who started as an Isolationist New Dealer and by degrees has turned into a confused anti-Administration Nationalist. He is a very eccentric and unpredictable political figure who continues to be radical in internal issues and obscurantist in foreign affairs. He is said to be prepared to approve of Britain after she had expiated her past errors by more suffering than she had already endured. He is entirely independent of business interests and pressure groups, and his strength comes from the traditional place occupied by his family in Wisconsin. On the whole an ally of the Isolationists.

The terms in which the recent unanimous approval by the committee of the continuance of the Lend-Lease Powers Bill was phrased left no doubt that the Senate is determined not to let the present Administration go an inch beyond the limits permitted it by Congress, that it suspects the President of trying to insert commitments on foreign policy, political and commercial, in agreements which are not formal treaties, e.g., the seventh article of the Lend-Lease Master Agreement, and that such attempts must be watched and, if necessary, curbed. This is dictated not so much by specific opposition to article 7 or to any other expression of international solidarity by the United States as by a violent desire to assert its authority against the Executive, whose invasion of the territory of the Legislature started, or is alleged to have started, long before the New Deal, although the pace has quickened since 1932.¹⁰

The post-war views of the committee are uncertain, and it would be a mistake to assume that the Southern Democrats in the Senate, inside and outside the committee, are necessarily full-blown internationalists. They may have been so in 1918, by the standards of what constituted internationalism at that time; and they were for the most part un-

¹⁰ Article 7 reads in part: “In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for aid furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to burden the commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods . . . ; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 14, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.” See *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49* (Washington, 1950), 5, and for a comprehensive study of the origins of the Lend Lease Act see Warren F. Kimball, *The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941* (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1969).

qualified interventionists; but in so far as an international outlook to-day entails freedom from economic nationalism, the southerners may well be found to balk at the full implications of such an attitude: certainly Mr. Hull's view must not be taken as necessarily characteristic of the general southern attitude. It cannot be too often repeated that thirty-three Senators have it in their power to wreck the treaty proposals of any Administration, and that more than that number are at present dubious of the desirability of establishing any real international system, whatever their views on "policing the world," the implications of which most of them have not thought out. The enthusiasm for such "policing" plans arises from the lesson which even the most purblind Isolationists have learnt, namely, that wars in Europe can in practice not be kept from American shores, that complete isolation is not practicable, and that the only reliable method of preserving peace in the Western Hemisphere lies in a forcible prevention of hostilities in the Eastern Hemisphere. Few Senators have given deep thought to the exact methods by which this is to be done, but the President appears to rely on the strength of the desire for this limited objective, since his present tactic seems to consist of trying to get Congress to approve specific steps of this kind in the hope that one thing will lead to another, the implementation of one policy will by insensible degrees generate other necessary supporting measures, and so a nucleus of an international arrangement will be born. He plainly believes that Congress will accept—as specific measures—on food, on policing, on lend-lease, etc. where it would boggle at and reject a cut-and-dried over-all plan of world settlement. The most recent resolution of the four Senators ([Joseph H.] Ball, [Harold H.] Burton, [Carl] Hatch and Lister Hill) may therefore be viewed as a trial balloon to determine how far Congress is prepared to go when the boggy of Government interference is removed and full initiative is placed in its own hands. If Congress, and in particular the Senate, can be made to feel that it is leading and not following, legislating a new world into existence and not fighting the President in defence of the old; the position, even with Republicans in power in 1944, may

be vastly different from and more hopeful than in 1918–19, and skilful piloting by the Administration may yet secure substantial results.

Annex on Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.

(Most Confidential).

The House Foreign Affairs Committee is, on the whole, a fairly liberal-minded body, and has become more rather than less tractable as a result of the November elections. The previous division as between Democrats and Republicans was fifteen to ten. Owing to the increased Republican vote in the House this has been altered to fourteen to eleven. Two Isolationist Republicans who were members of the committee in the last Congress—Hamilton Fish and the highly eccentric George Tinkham—have now left. Hamilton Fish was the ranking minority member who resigned shortly before the new Congress came in, in order to devote more time to the powerful House Rules Committee.

The ranking minority member is now Dr. Charles Eaton, a pro-British, internationally-minded member. Fish and Tinkham have been replaced by the admirable James Wadsworth, author of the Selective Service Act, and a supporter of the President's foreign policy, Andrew Schiffler of West Virginia and Charles Gerlach of Pennsylvania, neither of whom has so far shown any strong tendencies in any direction, nor displayed any marked anti-Administration sentiments.

The main opposition in the committee rests with four people—Chiperfield, Vorys, Mundt and Jonkman—who are all strongly suspicious of the President and fear he is trying to take both the direction of the war and the making of the peace out of the hands of Congress. The two women on the committee—Mrs. Roger and Mrs. Bolton—are border-line cases, though both were Isolationist before Pearl Harbour. The remaining Republican member, Foster Stearns, is a mild Willkieite in general outlook.

On the Democratic side the main weakness is probably the leadership of Sol Bloom, whose chairmanship of the committee is due solely to the processes of seniority, and certainly not to any outstanding ability or knowledge of


foreign affairs, but this is made up for by his blind loyalty to the President's policies. Though the six Democratic members who have left the committee were all supporters of the Administration's foreign policy, the Democrats have definitely gained by the acquisition of three staunch internationalists: Howard McMurray of Wisconsin, J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas and Will Rogers, Jr., of California. Fulbright and McMurray, in particular, are able and well informed and with plenty of fight in them.

Of the twenty-five members, nine Democrats are completely dependable supporters of the Administration, ten (five Democrats and five Republicans, the latter led by Wadsworth and Eaton) are likely to support the general foreign policy of the Administration, but may balk at anything savouring of New Deal planning. The four Mid-Western Republicans are definite opponents, and two (Mes. Rogers and Bolton) are inclined to opposition. Thus the Administration can normally count on a large majority for all moderate measures in this committee, which, though important, has incomparably less influence on foreign policy of the United States than its counterpart in the Senate.

Democrats

Sol Bloom (chairman) of New York. Has been in Congress since 1923. Is politically friendly toward the British and has been a consistent supporter of F.D.R.'s foreign policies. A Jew, who was elected mostly by Jewish and foreign elements in his New York district, he tends, therefore, to be Europe-conscious and strongly anti-Nazi. His chairmanship is due solely to the often-criticised process of seniority, and not to any outstanding knowledge of foreign affairs. He is of the easy-going, superficial, glad-handish type rather than a man of outstanding intellect; intensely patriotic in an emotional way despite his leaning towards internationalism. He helped to pilot the original Lend-Lease Act through the committee, and introduced the Act to extend Lend-Lease for one year. Age 73.

Luther Johnson of Texas. Also in Congress for nearly twenty years; a well-disposed farmer and capable business man. He is a typical southern Democrat in that he has



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Congressman Sol Bloom of New York.

stood staunchly behind the Administration's foreign policies and has supported most New Deal measures, except on such matters as labour. While strongly independent and equally strongly American, he is likely to put his weight behind the Administration's post-war policies and is traditionally pro-British. He made one of the most eloquent speeches in support of the unamended Lend-Lease Powers Act.

John Kee of West Virginia. Judge Kee has been in the House for ten years, and, while he has voted steadily for all the President's foreign policies, he is not either a forceful, influential or noticeably active member of the committee. An Episcopalian. Age 69.

James Richards of South Carolina. Also in the House for ten years. Supported the Administration on foreign policy before and after Pearl Harbour all the way with the single exception of the vote on lifting belligerent zones for American ships three weeks before Pearl Harbour. A Presbyterian. Age 49.

Probably internationalist rather than nationalist in outlook.

Joseph Pfeifer of New York. In Congress since 1935. Has a mixed record on foreign policy. He dissented on (1) lifting of arms embargo; (2) neutrality revision; (3) extension of conscription; (4) lifting of belligerent zones; but on other major issues of foreign policy, such as conscription, Lend-Lease (and the various appropriations for it) and the repeal of the ban on arming United States ships, he supported the Administration. Age 51. Internationalist.

Pete Jarman of Alabama. In Congress since 1937. A big, good-natured Rotarian type of man who has always supported the Administration's foreign policies to the full. Is reputedly pro-British and is likely to back any international post-war attempts by the Administration, although he is no out-and-out New Dealer. A Methodist; age 51.

W. O. Burgin of North Carolina. In Congress only since 1939. A meek, mild, homely figure who seldom makes his presence felt, but who has voted regularly for the President's foreign policy measures. A typical southern Democrat. A Methodist; age 66.

Wirt Courtney of Tennessee. In Congress since 1939. Typical of the southern Democratic vote of complete support for the Administration's foreign policies.

Herman Eberharter of Pennsylvania. In Congress since 1937. A New Dealer from Pittsburg [*sic*] of Austrian origin; internationalist-minded, and perhaps inclined to go slightly faster and further than the Administration. His position is well indicated by the fact that recently he urged that in the renewal of Lend-Lease there should be no implication in the wording that repayment is expected from the recipients. A Catholic; age 50; interested in the Austrian Legion.¹¹

Thomas Gordon of Illinois. A new-comer to the House from a strongly Polish district of Chicago. Likely to go along with the majority of the Committee in supporting the Government's foreign policy.

Howard McMurray of Wisconsin. Also a new-comer to the House, who defeated his Republican opponent mostly on the latter's Isolationist record. A man of some intellectual ability and a staunch internationalist, who has lectured for some years on national and

international affairs. Reportedly strongly pro-British and an advocate of "Union Now" with English-speaking peoples. Recently he criticised Republicans' attempt to get estimates in dollars and cents of the balance between Lend-Lease to Britain and British Reciprocal Aid, charging that such figures would give a misleading impression to the man in the street of Allied indebtedness, and warning that such an impression could be dangerously handled by those wanting to make trouble. Apt to irritate his more serious-minded colleagues by a stream of wisecracks.

Will Rogers Jr., of California. A new-comer to the House. Son of a very celebrated father. A sincere and somewhat impassioned young man who believes strongly in the Wallace type of internationalism and in co-operation with the United Nations. A trifle callow and politically inexperienced, he will undoubtedly be a vigorous and enthusiastic champion of all-out post-war co-operation with the United Nations. His fervent adherence to the liberal ideals of the "New Republic" may tend to make him critical of the British Empire. Age 31.

J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas. A distinguished new-comer to the House. A young (age 38) wealthy ex-Rhodes scholar, whose major experience so far has been of farming and business. He has already shown versatile competence and ability in business as special attorney in the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department and as president of the University of Arkansas. An alert and intelligent member of the committee who recently drew a comparison between the British practice of making grants to her allies and America's World War practice of making loans on fixed financial terms, to show that it was America which had departed from the general

¹¹ The idea of an Austrian Legion was first advanced by Otto von Habsburg, who spent the war years in America. He wanted, not only a return to the monarchy, but also an Austrian battalion in the American army that might help rescue his country in the cause of monarchy. He had access to both the White House and the State Department; and the Defense Department agreed with his plans for an Austrian Legion until it was discovered that most Austro-Americans were republicans and not monarchists, and the plan was promptly abandoned. See E. Wilder Spaulding, *The Quiet Invaders: The Story of the Austrian Impact Upon America* (Vienna, 1968), 89.



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Howard J. McMurray, Congressman from Wisconsin.

international practice in the matter. Fulbright would like to see the United States obtain only non-material benefits from Lend-Lease, namely, political commitments from the countries receiving it, that would enable a system of post-war collective security to be set up. An internationalist.

Mike Mansfield of Montana. A new-comer to the House, who is reportedly internationalist-minded, having been professor of history and political science at Montana State University for ten years. Though a supporter of the Administration's foreign policy, he is likely to be strongly critical of the smallness of China's share of Lend-Lease, and of what he fears is the Administration's tendency to regard the Atlantic as more important than the Pacific, and of its apparent reluctance to regard the Chinese as an ally on equal footing. His strongly pro-Chinese sentiments may tend to make him somewhat anti-British on this score.

Republicans

Charles Eaton of New Jersey. The ranking minority member, who has been in Congress

for nearly twenty years. His record on foreign policy prior to Pearl Harbour was very mixed. He was born in Nova Scotia and is frequently "ribbed" by his constituents for his pro-British sentiments. A humorous and intelligent member of the committee who seems more likely to go along with the Democratic majority than act as the leader of the Opposition. One-time special Canadian correspondent for the *New York Tribune* and *Boston Transcript*; also special correspondent of *London Times*. Aged 76. An internationalist who would like to see Lend-Lease moulded into the post-war machinery of international cooperation.

Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts. In Congress since 1925. She was an Isolationist up to and including the Lend-Lease, after which, however, she swung in behind the President on all major foreign policy measures. Though she is likely to continue her support, she will only do so after she has convinced herself that America's own best interests are thoroughly protected and that the Administration is not trying to "put something across." She is regarded in Congress as a capable, hard-working and intelligent woman. A pleasant and kindly old battle-axe—but a battle-axe. An Episcopalian; age 62. Probably nationalist rather than internationalist in outlook.

Robert Chipfield of Illinois. In Congress only since 1939. An out-and-out pre-Pearl Harbour Isolationist. One of the four Republican members who constitute the real Opposition in the committee. Suspicious of the President and of the executive's alleged attempts to by-pass and undermine Congressional authority. A sour and intransigent figure. In close relations with the *Chicago Tribune*. A Congregationalist; age 44. Nationalist.

John Vorys of Ohio. The real leader of the Opposition *Bloc* on the committee. He voted against all major foreign policy measures and was the author of the amendment in June 1939 which provided for a mandatory embargo on the export of arms to belligerent nations. A shrewd and active member likely to prove the most stubborn member of the committee. He constantly presses (and for obvious reasons) for some sort of dollar and cent estimate of the current balance as between Lend-

Lease and Reciprocal Aid and proposed the amendments which were later defeated, whereby Congress alone could authorise the final settlement. A Methodist; age 47; a formidable nationalist.

Foster Stearns of New Hampshire. In Congress since 1939. One of the liberal Republicans who supported the Administration's foreign policy on all major measures, and is reported to be in the Willkie camp, although likely to go along with the Democratic majority on the committee; unlikely to be much of a force, being a kindly old derelict rather than a man of parts. Previously in the State Department and in the American Embassy in Paris. A Catholic; age 62. A mild internationalist.

Karl Mundt of South Dakota. One of the four real Opposition members who voted rigidly against the Administration's foreign policy before Pearl Harbour. An ignorant man, gifted with a somewhat slow intelligence, but sincere and constantly baffled by problems largely outside his mental scope. His appetite for facts is, unfortunately, much greater than his ability to grasp and evaluate them. (Until quite recently, he was under the impression that Canada "paid tribute" to Britain!) Very much a corn area man and a protectionist, he shows signs of seeing that on America's post-war tariff policy may depend the success or failure of attempts at some form of international law and order. One of his pet ideas is that, in exchange for Lend-Lease, America should obtain air bases and post-war air transport facilities throughout the world. A thorn in the side of the Administration. Nationalist. A Methodist; age 43.

Bartel Jonkman of Michigan. In Congress only since 1940 and the fourth of the Republican Opposition group on the committee. An agreeable man, shrewd, capable and very determined in his opposition to the Administration in both its foreign and domestic policies. Pure Isolationist before Pearl Harbour, and, in fact, typical of the Michigan Republican *Bloc* (whose most notorious member is Clare Hoffman). Seems convinced America is playing Santa Claus again in this war, and is doing his best to obtain facts and figures which

will show up this fact. A Methodist; age 59. Nationalist.

Frances Bolton of Ohio. In Congress only since 1940. A quiet and moderately capable member of the committee, who, while not one of the active Opposition Four, is likely to be suspicious of any New Deal internationalism. Her record before Pearl Harbour was Isolationist. Nationalist rather than internationalist in outlook, at any rate, at present. Age 48.

James W. Wadsworth of New York. A newcomer to the committee; in the House since 1933. A highly respected and well-liked Congressman, who has voted in support of nearly all the President's foreign policy measures. One of the most forceful and independent-minded men in Congress and a highly skilled parliamentarian. While not favouring any "World New Deal," he is apparently in favour of American co-operation with the rest of the world and United States definite commitments to establish a secure peace, but disagrees with any attempt by the United States to interfere with other nations' internal politics or forms of government. A very effective supporter of the Administration's foreign policies, who did yeoman service by his speeches and active lobbying during the recent Lend-Lease debate. Was in the Senate from 1915-27. A wealthy Episcopalian squire, sympathetic to Moral Re-Armament. Age 66. An internationalist.

Andrew Schiffler of West Virginia. A newcomer both to the committee and to the House. Regarded as a capable business man. Little is known of his general attitude on foreign affairs, which is, on the whole, probably pro-Administration. A Presbyterian; age 54.

Charles Gerlach of Pennsylvania. A newcomer to the committee. A rugged Isolationist before Pearl Harbour, who voted only for purely defensive measures, such as conscription and arming of United States ships. Though he opposed the original Lend-Lease, he favoured its continuation, but would be difficult to say exactly where he stands on the larger questions of post-war American policy. Pennsylvania Dutch; age 48.